Afghan government will need to do better than Pakistan's has so far...

Foreign Policy magazine's website has an interesting article on the differences between Al Qaeda in Iraq and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan.  Here's the link:

http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/10/14/all_al_qaedas_are_not_created_equal

The article makes several good points, but I found the concluding paragraph most sobering in terms of the current debate over adding more troops.  Most of that debate has focused on whether or not the additional troops would enable success against the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan and whether, simultaneously, we can build up the capacity of the Afghan government and military.  Even if a counter-insurgency strategy with more US troops succeeds in neutralizing the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan and stabilizing the Afghan government in Kabul, however, it won't be enough:

An Afghan government unable (or unwilling) to control its entire territory will not adequately protect U.S. interests in the region. Though U.S. COIN strategy rightly prioritizes protecting the Afghan people over controlling territory, a COIN-produced Afghan government must eventually control both the people and the land, or al Qaeda will still have a safe haven from which to plot against the West. Pakistan has not controlled the Federally Administered Tribal Area for years. Iraq neither controls its northern third or its borders. To protect U.S. strategic interests, the Afghan government will have to do better.


So even if the Afghanistan "surge" works, it is hard to imagine the Kabul government being more willing and able than the Pakistani government to eliminate Al Qaeda from its territory.  It would require an ability to control the territory of the whole country, the political will to engage in difficult military operations in the mountainous border region with Pakistan against extremists who are fairly popular among the local population in some areas,  and military cooperation with the Pakistani government.  That means the Pakistani government will have to prove more willing and able to eliminate its own Taliban insurgency and Al Qaeda in the border region and elsewhere.


That's a tall order.