The Lesson of Egypt: A New Paradigm for US Foreign Policy

Some commentators in recent days have highlighted the dilemma for US policy makers in addressing the protests in Egypt:  How can we support calls for democracy and freedom in the Middle East while not rashly abandoning a vital US ally in the region?  Calling for Mubarak's ouster in the early days of the crisis could have sent the "wrong" message to other US allies in the region and around the world.  If you are an autocratic regime and face a popular uprising, the US will drop you like a hot potato.  The last thing the US needs in the Middle East and elsewhere is to have its allies and partners in the war on terror lose faith in our commitments to them.  If we would abandon Mubarak - for three decades, the most important and reliable US ally in the Arab world, in whom we've invested our trust and billions of US tax dollars - who wouldn't we abandon?


There's also the caution that "the devil you know may be better than the devil you don't know."  It's a compelling argument, since it wisely kept us from toppling Saddam Hussein during the 1990s.  Stability is better than a power vacuum, and a friendly dictator is better than a hostile one.  Mubarak played upon this fear, hyping the dangers presented by a possible Islamist takeover in Egypt (beware the Muslim Brotherhood - any group with the word "Muslim" in its name must be bad, right?  And some of al Qaeda's founders used to belong to the MB 30 years ago!).


So, do we have clear policy goals in the region, arguably the most important strategically in the world these days?


Well, some of my students tried to identify US policy goals in the Middle East and elsewhere last semester.  They were looking for clear, achievable and observable goals.  They couldn't find any.  Not for the Middle East.  Not for Afghanistan.  Not for the crisis in Mexico.  Not for combating human trafficking.  None.  I would suggest that part of the reason is that once you have clear goals, you will be judged by whether or not you actually achieved them.  Better to keep things fuzzy, so you can define (and redefine) success whenever you see fit.

But a longer-term view of US foreign policy in the region, and around the world, suggests that, perhaps, another reason is that we view our strategic interests too narrowly (Israel, al Qaeda and oil), overestimate our power and influence (yes, we can prop up autocratic regimes with money and weapons for a time, but not forever - see Iran, Marcos in the Philippines, and, now, Egypt), and emphasize short-term needs over long-term objectives.  As a result, our policy is more ad hoc, more reactive than proactive, and viewed by many as more hypocritical over time.  We support the one true democracy in the Middle East - Israel - consistently, but we are best of friends with some of the worst regimes in the region.  

As a result, much of the Arab world has lost trust in us, views us as part of the problem, or views us as the problem.  We seem forever sucked into the tension and turmoil of the region, in large part because we depend on its oil.  And we seem to need these brutal dictators as much as, if not more than, they need us.  So we cling to them, sending them billions of dollars in military and economic aid, training their armies, and sending them billions more for their oil.  And we send a clear message to their people, especially the poor and middle classes yearning for a better life and more freedom:  we choose stability (for the short- and maybe medium-term) over democracy and freedom.  We choose your oppressors over you, the victims.  We defend democracy and freedom for us and for some of our closest allies, but not for you.  Consider this:  do you think it is more likely that Egypt's citizens become more anti-US and more radicalized by us hedging our bets and standing by Mubarak or by supporting their struggle for democracy?

If we should choose to truly think strategically, perhaps ridding ourselves of our dependence on foreign oil and trying harder to "do no harm" would be a start.  Peter Maass had a short but excellent article in August on the hidden costs of our foreign oil dependence.  The true cost of protecting access to Middle Eastern oil - for us, Europe, Asia, and the world - is staggering.

So let's start with one clear, achievable and observable goal that deals with that challenge.  In 2009, the US imported 4.2 billion barrels of oil, or about 52% of its oil needs.  Let's cut it to half the 2009 level ten years:  2.1 billion barrels in 2021.  If we could go to the moon in eight years (JFK gave us a whole decade and we didn't need it!), why not cut our foreign oil imports by half in ten?  Audacious?  Sure.  But isn't this urgent and important enough to be a little audacious?  Two-thirds of our oil consumption is for transportation, and 2/3 of that is for gasoline.  Let's make the switch to hybrids and plug-in electric vehicles a national priority.  Let's get state, local, and federal vehicles switched over to electric or natural gas.  A combination of tax incentives and higher gas mileage standards could do the trick.  Switch the subsidies for big oil companies over to tax breaks for people and companies buying electric, hybrid, and natural gas vehicles.

Oh, and let's support the people who want to be free.  That's something we can do now.  Try this goal:  Mubarak gone, and replaced by a transitional government of national unity charged with drafting a new Egyptian constitution, by tomorrow.