Bush on Darfur - Still too little, still too late...

President Bush is doing a great job of sounding concerned about Darfur without actually doing anything that will stop the genocide. On March 29, he said:

I'm deeply worried about the human conditions in Darfur. Ours is a government
that spoke out about genocide, and we meant it. I thanked President
Obasanjo
for the AU presence in the Sudan. I told him, however, I did not think the
presence was robust enough. I do believe there needs to be
a blue helmeting
of not only the AU forces, but additional forces with a NATO overlay. And the
reason I believe that NATO ought to be a part of the operation is twofold:
One, to provide logistical and command and control and airlift capability, but
also to send a clear signal to parties involved that
the West is determined
to help a settlement -- to help affect in a settlement, that this is serious
business, that we're just not playing a diplomatic holding game, but that when
we say, genocide, we mean that the genocide needs to be stopped.

Clearly, the African Union force in incapable of stopping the bloodshed. Merely sticking UN blue helmets on the heads of the AU soldiers and giving them a NATO taxi service is unlikely to turn them into the peacemaking force they need to be. Bush's statement seemed to echo a recent NATO statement that virtually ruled out a NATO "bridging force" that would intervene until a capable UN force could be deployed.

Bush has much to gain by showing real leadership on Darfur. Understanding that his legacy will largely be determined by the long-term outcome in Iraq, that legacy could be significantly enhanced by a successful initiative that stops the genocide in Darfur.

After speaking with Eric Reeves the other day, it seems clear to me that what is needed is a clear goal - or set of goals - and the forces to accomplish those goals. Operationally, these goals might sound like:

- Seal the border with Chad so that refugees fleeing Darfur are not pursued across the border.

- Provide security so that refugees may return to their homes in safety.

- Provide security so that refugees may return to their homes and resume farming so that they might be able to feed themselves over the long-term.

Each of those goals would require a different force in terms of size and capabilities. Moreover, the duration of each mission would likely vary, perhaps considerably.

The International Crisis Group (ICG) suggests in a recent report that "monitoring" the Chad-Sudan border, protecting civilians, and enforcing a ceasefire could be done with 15,000 UN troops, provided the bulk of the troops comes from a militarily capable NATO member, like France.

Putting aside, for a moment, the legacy of French blue helmets in Bosnia (who allowed the Bosnian Deputy Prime Minister under their protection to be executed by Serb forces, among other failings), President Bush's recent statement clearly falls short of endorsing even such a modest proposal from the ICG. Yet, in comparison to his fellow heads of state, Bush could be seen as leading the way on Darfur.

The question of French troops does, however, underscore the point that there are few countries with the military capabilities of intervening in a genocide like Darfur. As with Bosnia, however, the real question ultimately comes down to political will. Who has the political will to actually intervene and stop the genocide? Clearly President Bush does not. He's willing to call it a genocide and, possibly, give someone else a lift if they want to go stop it. But saying you'll support a UN mission without sending your own troops starts to sound like then-President Clinton hiding behind the failed UN mission in Bosnia. It is difficult to convince other countries to risk their troops if you're not willing to do the same. That does make it convenient, however, if what you ultimately want is an excuse for your failed diplomacy.

That's why, even though political "realities" in the the U.S., Sudan, and at the UN Security Council may render it moot, Bush has two options for getting other countries to step up to the plate:

- Bush could state publicly that he is willing to send U.S. troops as part of a NATO mission to stop the genocide. Then he could turn to other countries and ask them to join us in making this "sacrifice" in order to stop these crimes against humanity. In the end, U.S. troop participation might prove politically impossible, but he would have demonstrated that we are not interested in stopping a genocide only when others put their lives on the line. Or,

- Bush will need to engage in a diplomatic full-court press that involves lots of public and private diplomacy to secure a NATO mission - even if those NATO troops are wearing blue helmets - to stop the genocide. The U.S. likely will need to participate by providing logistics, intelligence, and airlift capability. But President Bush will need to act forcefully to make sure that our allies provide the troops necessary to make the ground forces credible and capable. In all likelihood, this means a NATO rapid reaction force between 5,000 and 15,000 troops that can respond quickly and decisively to any assault on civilians or gathering of militarily-significant forces. Without making a similar commitment for U.S. forces, Bush will need to bring the full force of U.S. diplomacy to bear - something he has thus far been unwilling to do.

Those who truly support an end to the genocide in Darfur need to hold Bush accountable. Bush has been content to merely doing more than his counterparts. He "spoke out about genocide" - others have refused to use that term. But does calling for a UN force that is incapable of stopping the carnage demonstrate that he "meant it"?

Let's say what we want - clear goals, as I have outlined above - and understand what it will take to accomplish them. Until Bush stands behind that agenda - and is taking clear, concrete steps to accomplish those goals - let's all make it clear: he doesn't mean it.