- US/NATO airstrikes to stop the shelling of civilians until the Bosnian government could defend itself.
- Lifting of the US arms embargo against Bosnia so that Bosnia could get weapons to defend itself.
- Punishment of the war criminals responsible for orchestrating the genocide.
- Preservation of Bosnia's territorial integrity (no partition along ethnic/religious lines).
The central goal was the lifting of the arms embargo. On one level, it seemed obvious and simple: let the Bosnians defend themselves and we won't have to send our troops to do it for them. The issue, however, was complicated because the UN Security Council had passed a resolution - at Milosevic's initial suggestion - placing an arms embargo on the whole of Yugoslavia prior to Bosnia's independence. Bosnia's independence and the Belgrade-led genocide had rendered the UN embargo moot with regard to Bosnia; every country has an inherent right to self defense, recognized by the UN Charter. But arguing that point sounded to many like legalistic mumbo-jumbo, as former Secretary of State Larry Eagleburger complained to me on CNN's Crossfire in 1995. Many with more lobbying experience than I had (none at the time), including a former leading House Democrat supportive of the Bosnian cause, told me we were well-intentioned but naive to think that we could get Congress to lift the embargo.
Even so, in the summer of '95, we were able to get a veto-proof majority of both houses of Congress to pass binding legislation lifting the US embargo. that incredible act of congressional leadership is part of what prompted Clinton, after vetoing the legislation while Congress was in recess, to launch the initiative that led to the Dayton Accords ending the Bosnian genocide.
In comparison, Darfur offers little of the clarity in terms of a clear action agenda or public support that Bosnia did at the time. Many Americans still had fond memories of the Sarajevo Olympics of 1984 and the warm and endearing Bosnians we saw on TV. We could watch some of the horrors of Bosnia on TV at night, though the so-called "CNN effect" cut both ways: it brought the war to our living rooms on a regular basis, but it numbed and confused us as often as it enraged us. The Bosnian government and army offered a proxy for US intervention - arm the Bosnians and our troops can stay home. Bosnia was in Europe, and the risk of a broader conflict involving NATO allies was a constant source of concern, as was the image of a slaughter in Europe just a short train ride from hundreds of thousands of US and NATO troops in Europe.
Darfur offers none of those "advantages" the Bosnian genocide offered those of us agitating for some kind of response. With the exception of Nicholas Kristof of the New York Times, there has been little regular reporting from the region and few TV images. The apparent US quagmire in Iraq has soured many Americans who might have favored a military intervention in Darfur, either because they have little or no confidence in this administration's ability to carry it out successfully or they are concerned about the backlash from another US military mission in another Arab country.
Kristof, writing in the February 12 Times, offered this menu of options for President Bush:
Here are some grown-up steps Mr. Bush could take: He could enforce a no-fly zone to stop air attacks on civilians in Darfur, lobby Arab leaders to become involved, call President Hu Jintao and ask China to stop protecting Sudan, invite Darfur refugees to a photo op at the White House, attend a coming donor conference for Darfur, visit Darfur or the refugee camps next door in Chad, push France and other allies for a NATO bridging force to provide protection until United Nations troops arrive, offer to support the United Nations force with American military airlift and logistical support (though not ground troops, which would help Sudan's hard-liners by allowing them to claim that the United States was starting a new invasion of the Arab world), make a major speech about Darfur, and arrange for Colin Powell to be appointed a United Nations special envoy to seek peace among Darfur's tribal sheiks.
With a president obviously too distracted or apathetic to take action on his own, activists are left to seek support and leadership in Congress, just as we did during the Bosnia genocide. There is nothing, however, so "simple" as an arms embargo to lift with the passage of a law. Short of declaring war on Sudan, Congress cannot force President Bush to do anything on Kristof's list. Legislation has been proposed that calls for a NATO "bridging force" that would provide some relief to Darfur's victims until a UN peacekeeping force can be "fully deployed." H Res. 723, and its previously-approved Senate version, is not binding legislation - it would not compel President Bush to act.
Moreover, it remains unclear what a "fully deployed" UN force would need to look like or who would provide the troops. Various current and former UN officials have estimated anywhere from 10,000 to 50,000 or more troops would be necessary to stop the genocide in Darfur. A serious analysis of what is needed - and who could provide those assets - is needed. NATO's Secretary General indicated on his trip to DC last week that NATO would stand ready to participate if asked. That will require some arm-twisting on Bush's part, at least to get France to sit passively by and not block such a deployment. Such a force would probably require US logistical, intelligence, and transportation assistance - but because of Iraq and the other concerns noted above, US ground troops would not likely be involved.
And that is the real problem. It is difficult to ask others to make sacrifices you cannot - or will not - make yourself. It requires real leadership. That's one of many things we seem to be running a deficit in these days...
No comments:
Post a Comment